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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

CORPORATIONS-APPRAISAL STATUTES-DEMAND BY DISSENTING SHAREHOLDER FOR CASH VALUE. OF H1s SHARES-Plaintiff shareholder, who dis-. sented from a plan to sell all of defendant corporation's assets, sued under the
Ohio statute 1 to obtain appraisal of his shares. At plaintiff's request, an objection to the sale and a demand for the cash value of his shares w;_as served
upon defendant by his, attorney.. Although the demand was made within the
required period after the shareholders' meeting at which the plan was accepted,
the trial court refused to allow appraisal on the ground that plaintiff did not
make the demand personally and had not notified .the corporation that his attorney was authorized to act in his behalf in making the demand. On appeal,
held, affirmed •. Where demand for payment is made by an attorney, there
must be an appointment in writing, signed by the shareholder, and exhibited
to the corporation within the statutory period allowed for demand. Klein v.
United Theaters Co., (Ohio 1947) 74 N.E. (2d) 319.
Generally, courts have been strict in requiring the shareholder to comply
with conditions precedent to appraisal,2 in spite of the assertion found both in
'

1 " • • • Within twenty days after the day on which the vote was taken, [ the
shareholder] shall object in writing to the action so taken and shall demand in writing
the payment of such fair cash value of his shares." Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, r938)
§8623-72.
2 Johnson v. C. Brigham Co., 126 Me. 108, 136 A. 456 (1927); Stephenson v.
Commonwealth & Southern Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 447, 168 A. 2II (1933); Friedman
v. Booth Fisheries Corp., (Del. Ch. 1944) 39 A. (2d) 761.

RECENT DECISIONS

texts and decisions that the statute should be liberally construed in favor of the
shareholder.3 The court in the principal case concludes that the language of
the statute leaves the dissenting shareholder with the alternatives of making his
demand in person or by proxy. In the latter case he must conform to the requirements prescribed by the statute pertaining to the use of proxies, which
include notifying the corporation thereof. 4 It is suggested, however, that the
proxy statute was never intended to have any application outside the scope of
shareholders' meetings. It would also appear that the possibility of one's misrepresenting his authority to make objection and demand for a dissenting shareholder should not require the same precautions as those used to prevent the
casting of an unauthorized vote. With these factors in mind, and considering
that the appraisal statute includes no reference to the shareholder's acting by
proxy, it is at least arguable that the legislature intended that a shareholder could
follow the normal law of agency in appointing a representative to make demand. If this is accepted, there appears to be little doubt that the authority of plaintiff's
attorney to make demand on his behalf was adequately established.5 Even if
this approach is rejected, the alternative construction of the statute would compel the shareholder to make demand personally, without even the right to use
a proxy. Exclusion of a shareholder from his right to appraisal on such a
technical and perhaps artificial ground becomes more unsatisfactory when the
problems to which it may give rise are considered. The Ohio decisions indicate that appraisal is not the dissenting shareholder's exclusive remedy, but that
he may elect either to oppose the majority's action by a suit in equity, or to
liquidat~ his investment in the corporation by appraisal. 6 This cannot be taken
8
15 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP., perm. ed., § 7165 (1938); In re Camden Trust
Co., 121 N.J.L. 222, 1 A. (2d) 475 (1938); Schenck v. Salt Dome Oil Co., (Del.
Ch. 1943) 34 A. (2d) 249. Since the statute abolishes the right possessed by a single
shareholder at common law to prevent such actions as sale of all the corporation's
assets and consolidation, it should be liberally construed in favor of the shareholder.
4
Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1938) § 8623-53, which provides that any shareholder of record who is entitled to attend a shareholders' meeting, may be represented at such a meeting by a proxy " . • • to vote thereat • . • or to exercise any
other of his rights." Particularly when read in connection with the proxy statutes
of other states and with the Ohio statute which it supplanted, it appears that "any
other of his rights" refers ouly to rights which might be exercised at a shareholders'
meeting.
5 l AGENCY RESTATEMENT,§ 26 (1933). I MECHEM, AGENCY,§ 743 (1914);
Gore v. Canada Life Assurance Co., II9 Mich. 136, 77 N.W. 650 (1898); 2
MECHEM, AGENCY, § 2052 (1914).
6
Johnson v. Lamprecht, 133 Ohio St. 567, 15 N.E. (2d) 127 (1938); Wick
v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 46 Ohio App. 253, 188 N.E. 514 (1932); Goodisson
v. North American Sec. Co., 40 Ohio App. 85, 178 N.E. 29 (1931). The appraisal remedy has been made exclusive by statute in some states, and by decision in
others. Mich. Pub. Acts (1931) No. 327, §§ 44, 54; Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1937)
§ 369 (17); Beechwood Sec. Corp. v. Associated Oil Co., (C.C.A. 9th, 1939) 104
F.·(2d) 537; Adams v. U.S. Dist. Corp., 184 Va. 134, 34 S.E. (2d) 244 (1945);
Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 32, § 157.73; Morris v. Columbia Apts. Corp.,
323 Ill. App. 292, 55 N.E. (2d) 401 (1944). Writers on the subject seem to be
unanimously in favor of regarding appraisal as an alternative and not an exclusive
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to indicate, however, that after determining to sever his connection with the
corporation, the dissenter would be able to affirm that connection by seeking to
enjoin or avoid the sale. Furthermore, having registered his dissent, the plaintiff
lost his right as a shareholder to participate in corporate activities." With the
denial of his petition, it would seem that his rights should be restored retroactively. The problems which this might create, however, particularly in connection
with the voting right, add force to the argument against placing any but the
most necessary obstacles in the path of appraisal of the dissenting shares. Whatever criticism can be made of the opinion, it is decidedly in harmony with the
few decisions on this precise question in other states.8 The Ohio court seemed
to rely heavily on these decisions.

William J. Schrenk

remedy. Levy, "Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment," 15
CoRN. L. Q. 420 (1930); Lattin, "Remedies of Dissenting Shareholders Under Appraisal Statutes," 45 HARV. L. REV. 233 (1931).
1 "A shareholder who so objects . . . shall not be entitled to vote such shares
or to exercise any rights respecting such shares or to receive any dividends. • • ."
Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1938) § 8623-72. On the question of such interim rights
generally, see Robinson, "Dissenting Shareholders: Their Right to Dividends and
the Valuation of Their Shares," 32 CoL. L. REv. 60 (1932).
8 In re Universal Pictures, (Del. Ch. 1944) 37 A. (2d) 615; Friedman v.
Booth Fisheries Corp., (Del. Ch. 1944) 39 A. (2d) 761; Era Co. v. Pittsburgh
Consol. Coal Co., 355 Pa. 219, 49.A. (2d) 342 (1946). A contrary view seems to be
taken, however, in Application of Baker, 257 App. Div. 1024, 13 N.Y.S. (2d) 408
(1939), where, under facts similar to those of the principal case, the court allowed
the corporation .to inquire into the ·agent's authority to make demand, but found it
adequate, even though the shareholder had not notified the corporation of it.

